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Existing Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks detections in software defined networks
(SDNs) typically only carry out detection in a single domain. In reality, abnormal traffic usually affects
multiple network domains. Thus, the cross-domain attacks detection has been proposed to improve the
detection performance. However when participating in the detection each SDNs domain needs to provide
a large number of real traffic data where private information may be leaked out. Existing multiparty
privacy protection schemes often achieve privacy guarantees by sacrificing accuracy or increasing the
time cost. It is a challenging task to have both high accuracy and reasonable time consumption.
In this paper, we propose Predis, a privacy-preserving cross-domain attacks detection scheme for
SDNs. Predis combines perturbation encryption and data encryption to protect privacy, and uses a
computationally simple and efficient algorithm k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) as its detection algorithm. We
also improve the kNN to achieve better efficiency. Through theoretical analysis and extensive simulations,
we demonstrate that Predis is capable to achieve efficient and accurate attacks detection, while keeping
sensitive information of each domain secure.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) have emerged as a new networking paradigm, which is
liberated from the vertical integration in traditional networks and gives the program and the
network their flexibility through a centralized logical network controller [1]. SDNs consists of
the data plane, the control plane and the application plane. The control plane contains some
controllers that run the control logic strategy and maintains the entire network view as a logic-
centric. The controllers abstract the whole network view into network services and provide the
easy-to-use interface for operators, researchers or third parties to facilitate these personnel to
customize the privatization applications and realize the logical management of the network. Users
of the SDNs don’t need to worry about the technical details of the underlying device, just a
simple programming can realize the rapid deployment of new applications.
SDNs simplify the network management and adapt better to the current situation in which the
network size continues to expand rapidly.
However the features of the centralized control and programming make SDNs susceptible to
the well-known Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. For instance, the controller, which
plays a crucial role in determining the functionality of each component in SDNs, is a main target
of DDoS attacks [1]. A compromised controller would result in paralyzation or misbehaving of
all switches under its control.
Denial of service (DoS) attack can run out of the resources of a system on the target computer,
stop services and leave its normal users inaccessible. When hackers use two or more compromised
computers on the network as ”puppet machine” to launch DoS attacks on a specific target, it
is referred to as DDoS attacks. The puppet machine’s IP address and the structure and form
of attack packet is random, making it difficult to trace the the attacker. DDoS attacks have
become a severe threat to today’s Internet and the attacks make online services unavailable
by overwhelming victims with traffic from multiple attackers. With the number of businesses
migrating their operations online growing dramatically, DDoS attacks can lead to significant
financial losses. A recent report reveals that DDoS attacks account for 22% of the 2015 data
center downtime [2].
DDoS attacks essentially operate in three steps [3], i.e., scanning, intrusion, and attack launch-
ing. Abnormal traffic of DDoS attacks usually affects multiple paths and network domains (e.g.,
SDNs domains). For ease of illustration, we analyze the stages of typical DDoS attacks using
3TABLE I
ANALYSIS OF LLDOS DATASET
The Number of Flows
Stage 172.16.112.* 172.16.113.* 172.16.114.* 172.16.115.* Victim Attacker Merge
Scanning 424 328 32 296 0 1081 1081
Intrusion 128 0 97 0 0 332 335
Attacking 2 0 0 285 107465 199 107667
the datasets collected by the Lincoln Laboratory of MIT [4], LLDOS 1.0, as shown in Table I.
Prior to the launch of the attack, abnormal traffic can be observed at the stages of scanning and
intrusion. If the victim and the puppet machines under DDoS attacks were located in different
network domains, a detection attempt restricted within a single domain would be unable to
identify the attacks at their primary stages. Thus, the involvement of multiple domains in attacks
detection will help to achieve more accurate and timely detections [5], [6].
In the SDNs environment, the collaborative detection across multiple domains requires detailed
traffic data of each domain involved, such as the content of the flow table in the latest seconds.
However this may cause serious privacy concerns on the SDNs operators, as the traffic data
reveals sensitive information, such as source IP addresses, destination IP addresses, and traffic
statistics [7], which have potential utility in mining network topology and network connection
behaviors [8]–[10]; Accordingly, SDNs operators are reluctant to share their detailed intra-domain
traffic data with each other. Therefore, trade-offs between attacks detection efficiency and privacy
protection should be carefully balanced in SDNs.
Many schemes of DDoS attacks detection in traditional networks have been proposed and
have showed satisfying results [11]–[17]. Extensive studies on DDoS attacks in SDNs have also
been done and many traffic classifiers with excellent performance have been proposed (e.g.,
graphic model [18], the entropy variation of the destination IP address [19], Support Vector
Machine (SVM) [20]). While these DDoS attacks detection schemes are usually restricted to
a single domain [21], very few studies have considered cross-domain attacks detection. Bian
et al. [22] proposed a scheme for cross-domain DDoS attacks detection in SDNs using Self-
organizing Map (SOM) as the traffic classifier. The calculation in the training and the test phase
is very complicated when SOM as the classifier which requires multiple vector multiplications,
or more complex divition. Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) [23], [24] may enable secure
4cross-domain anomaly detection (e.g., secure addition protocol, secure multiplication protocol
and secure compare protocol). However, these protocols require a large amount of interaction
from the participants and calculations on ciphertext, which undoubtedly consumes many of the
controller’s bandwidth.
Cross-domain attacks detection will lead to privacy leakage, whereas the introduction of
privacy protection usually comes at a cost of excessive time consumption and low detection
rate. We should address these challenges when detecting DDoS attacks in cross-domain. The
first challenge is how to conduct cross-domain DDoS attacks detection in SDNs without revealing
privacy of each network domain. Anomaly detection classifiers require detailed traffic data, and
SDNs domains do not trust each other. It is necessary that we work out the privacy issue when
multiple SDNs domains work together to perform anomaly detection. The second challenge is
to ensure efficient and accurate DDoS attacks detection while well-preserving privacy. Strong
privacy protection in multi-party cooperation is often at the cost of accuracy and high time-
consumption, and it is hard to give priority to one or the other. In the face of these dilemmas,
we resort to decoupling the detection into two steps, disturbance and detection and, introducing
two servers that work in collaboration to complete the detection process.
We combine digital cryptography with perturbation encryption to address the first challenge.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to protect the privacy in data transmission process
between two servers and SDNs controllers, and perturbation encryption to protect that privacy is
not compromised when calculating on the two servers. The ciphertext produced by perturbation
encryption, since the special design of Predis, can be compute directly in servers without the
need to use complex security computing protocols.
With respect to the second challenge, we use the features of k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) of
calculate simple, decoupling the kNN algorithm into two steps and embedding the encryption
steps into it. After giving the training data, kNN can classify the test samples by choosing
a distance measurement formula without a training phase (Euclidean distance1 is selected in
Predis). The kNN’s features of easy to implement is very useful for us when we want to
embed some special operations into the classifier to protect the privacy of test data. On the other
hand, kNN, as a classification algorithm, has excellent performance in accuracy, and kNN is not
sensitive to outliers which can maintain high accuracy when there are some noises in dataset.
1The formula of European distance of n-dimensional vector is d =
√∑n
i=1 (xi1 − x2i)2.
5kNN as the classifier with high accuracy has been widely used in many different areas [25]–[27].
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We propose Predis, a privacy-preserving cross-domain DDoS attacks detection scheme
for SDNs, which considers both the cross-domain DDoS attacks detection and the privacy
protection in multi-party cooperation. Predis uses the features of SDNs and the improved
kNN algorithm to detect DDoS attacks accurately within effective time, and combines the
digital cryptography with perturbation encryption to provide the confidentiality and every
participant’s privacy.
2) We prove the security of Predis by the asymptotic approach of computational security
in modern cryptography. Through rigorous security analysis, we prove that the traffic data
provided by each participant is indistinguishable for potential adversary.
3) We conduct extensive experiments using multiple authoritative datasets to demonstrate the
timeliness and accuracy of Predis. We show that our scheme not only can determine
if the traffic is abnormal, but also can find abnormal traffic at the early stages of DDoS
attacks. Results show that Predis is more accurate than existing detection schemes,
meanwhile protecting participants’ privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the related work in Section II and
introduce the thread model and security goals in Section III. We introduce the improved kNN
algorithm in Section IV and describe the design of Predis as well as the concrete calculation
steps and encryption details in Section V. We present the security analysis in Section VI and
the experimental results in Section VII. We conclude this paper in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Background of DDoS Attacks
DDoS attackers can simultaneously control several computers and create an attack architecture
that contains control puppets and attack puppets [3], as shown in Figure 1. The traditional attack
architecture is analogous to a dumbbell-shaped structure, where an intermediate network is only
responsible for data forwarding and security events and control functions are entirely done by
management, while the network itself does not have the ability to detect and deal with network
attacks.
6Fig. 1. A typical structure of DDoS Attacks
B. Summary of DDoS Attacks Detection Methods
There are numerous studies on DDoS attacks detection because of the severity and prevalence
of DDoS attacks. Here we briefly summarize the related work from two perspectives, i.e., DDoS
attacks detection in conventional networks and DDoS attacks detection in SDNs, as listed in
Table II.
Detection in conventional networks. Detection approaches of DDoS attacks have been studied
extensively in conventional networks, where methods such as Entropy based [12], SVM [13],
Naive Bayesian [15], Neural Network [16], cluster analysis [17], Artificial Neural Network
(ANN) [14], and kNN [11] are used as classifiers.
Detection in SDNs. The SDNs controller collects information of flow table and uses selected
classifiers to classify network traffic flows as either normal or abnormal. Based on the capability
of logical centralized controller and programmability of the network, network administrators can
respond to the attacks immediately. Classic classification methods of Bayesian Networks [28]
and SVM [20], as well as neural networks of SOM [22], [29], [30] and Deep Learning [31] are
used as traffic classifiers in SDNs.
The methods proposed above except Bian et al. not considered cross-domain attacks detection,
naturally they didn’t consider the privacy protection, and these methods require complex cal-
culations like vector multiplications, or more complex vector division during the testing phase
7TABLE II
SUMMARY OF EXISTING DDOS ATTACKS DETECTION METHODS
Network Environment Classifiers Reference
Conventional Network
Entropy based David et al. [12]
Support Vector Machine Yusof et al. [13]
Naive Bayesian Singh et al. [15]
Neural network Hsieh et al. [16]
Cluster analysis Wei et al. [17]
Artificial Neural Network Saied et al. [14]
k-Nearest Neighbor Thwe et al. [11]
SDNs
Self-organizing map
Braga et al. [30]
Xu et al. [29]
Bian et al. [22]
Support Vector Machine Kokila et al. [20]
Entropy variation of the destination IP address Mousavi et al. [19]
Deep Learning Niyaz et al. [31]
Bayesian Networks Nanda et al. [28]
(e.g., the calculation formula of Naive Bayesian is f (x) =
∏d
i=1 p (xi|y)2). If these methods
are conducted directly for cross-domain attacks detection, secure computation protocols will be
needed to solve the privacy protection. Predis not only protects the privacy but also avoids the
extensive interactions and calculations that are required when using secure computing protocols.
Bian et al. [22] considered both cross-domain DDoS attacks detection and privacy protection.
They proposed a privacy-preserving cross-domain detection scheme, using SOM as classifier.
But their method has major complications if it came to computations, i.e., the time complexity
of training a neural network and test should be O(mn2) and O(n2), respectively, where n is
the number of neurons and m is the number of training samples. The time complexity of our
method in the testing phase is O(m), and as a type of instance-based learning (or lazy learning),
kNN don’t has training phase. In addition, they failed to consider detecting DDoS attacks at their
early stages. We attempt to find anomaly at the early stages of DDoS attacks, because if we find
anomaly before the stage of attacking, we can take countermeasures (e.g., by blocking ingress
traffic with certain attack characteristics) to avoid further losses. However, this importance has
2x is the test instance, d is the dimensions of test instance and y is the class mark.
8hardly been realized by most of the prior studies. Mousavi et al. [19] proposed a method to
detect DDoS attacks in SDNs, which claims that it can detect DDoS attacks within the first
five-hundred packets of the attack traffic. Given that if puppet machines and the victim were in
different SDNs domains, traffic will not be reflected as being abnormal.
C. Privacy-preserving in Cross-domain Detection
A SDNs domain in Predis refers to a controlled domain under SDNs architecture, which
is a network domain with the deployment of the SDNs techniques and can be independently
controlled by operators. The SDNs domains conduct centralized control of data forwarding. The
multiple SDNs domains described in our article collaborate and these SDNs domains may or
may not be adjacent at physical or geographical location. The control plane of SDNs domains
centralized sends flow table to a specified location (i.e. computing server). The computing server
provides the DDOS detection service and return detection results controllers. Traditional network
domains for traffic forwarding is a distributed control, it can’t achieve centralized control.
Privacy-preserving cross-domain attacks detection can be see as a Secure Multi-Party Com-
putation (SMC) problem [32], which is the matter of how to safely calculate a function when
no credible third party is present. There are a hit research subject [33]–[36] about it.
Chen et al. [37] present a cryptographic protocol specially devised for privacy-preserving
cross-domain routing optimization in SDNs. But these methods do not apply to the problem
of cross-domain attacks detection. Martin et al. [38] investigated the practical usefulness of
solutions based on SMC, having designed optimized secure multiparty computation operations
that ran efficiently on voluminous input data. Their method may provide a new insight into the
problem in this paper, but their application scenarios are not exactly the same as ours.
Predis uses the kNN algorithm as the classifier to perform DDoS attacks detection. The
kNN technique has been employed to solve privacy-preserving problems before, and there are
already several eminent secure kNN protocols. Wong et al. [39] proposed ASPE, a protocol which
preserved a special type of scalar product, and constructed two secure schemes that supported
kNN computation on encrypted data. Elmehdwi et al. [40] set up SkNN, which provided better
security in solving the kNN query problem over encrypted database outsourced to a cloud. Cao et
al. [41] proposed MRSE, which defined and solved the problem of multi-keyword ranked search
over encrypted cloud data. These secure kNN protocols focus on applying kNN to querying over
encrypted data. Secure kNN does inspire us in some ways the problem to be dealt with is DDoS
9attacks detection, which demands a higher accuracy and an immediate response and is different
to the querying problem over encrypted data.
Comparing with previous studies about DDoS attacks detection, Predis not only considers
detecting DDoS attacks over multiple domains with privacy-preserving, but also attempts to
detect DDoS attacks at the early stages.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we first describe the overview of the system model and the roles involved in
Predis. Then, we present the thread model, followed by the security goals.
A. System Model
Predis mainly contains three types of roles: Computing Server (CS), Detection Server (DS)
and SDNs domains3, as exhibited in Figure 2(a). Domain Dn is the n-th domain who participates
in attacks detection and provides data to CS and DS, which, in turn, provide computing and
encryption services for domain Dn.
The system sequence diagram is shown in Figure 2(b). Each domain sends traffic information
to CS for calculation and receives the detection results from DS. CS provides computing service
and sends the intermediate results to DS, where the latter provides detection service based on the
intermediate results and replies the detection results to each domain. Thus, CS and DS perform
computation in collaboration with one another. The details of how computing and encryption
work in CS and DS will be described later in Section V.
Predis provides accurate DDoS attacks detection service for domains, where each domain
is unwilling to share privacy traffic information. Here, we give a formal definition of privacy as
follows:
Definition 1: (Privacy). The information of flow table is provided by domains that participate
in the detection. Specifically, privacy includes IP Source, IP Destination, Port Source, Port
Destination, Length, and Flow Packets.
We define the basic operations in Predis of the three roles mentioned above as three
functions with input and output. Each function is designed to run on continuous inputs in real time
of data partitioned into a certain time interval. Predis has a set of n input peers. Input peers
3Hereafter we refer to domains as SDNs domains unless otherwise stated.
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(a) System Overview (b) System Sequence Chart
Fig. 2. Privacy-preserving Cross-domain Attacks Detection Scheme Schematic Diagram.
want to jointly compute the final result of Predis on their private data without the slightest
relevant disclosure. Predis has m players called privacy peers that perform the computation
of Predis by simulating a trusted third party (TTP) [38]. Domains are both input peers and
privacy peers, while CS and DS are privacy peers.
B. Threat Model
We abstract the corss-domain privacy-preserving DDoS attacks detection problem with a threat
model. In the thread model, there are two types of adversaries, namely the external adversary
and the semi-honest adversary.
External adversary. Adversaries that through Internet eavesdropping or data interception and
other means to illegally obtain the data in the transmission process for their purposes.
Semi-honest adversary. A curious participant who follows the protocol properly to fulfill
service functions, but tries its best to infer sensitive or private information from intermediate
results of calculation, or even colludes with other participants.
Privacy peers will set up a secure, confidential and authentic channel connecting each other to
resist the external adversary. In Predis, we use TLS to build this secure channel. We adopt the
semi-honest assumption for all privacy peers. Honest privacy peers follow the protocol and do
not combine their information. Semi-honest privacy peers do follow the protocol but try to infer
input peers’ privacy as much as possible from the values they learn, and also by combining their
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information. Domains are hoping to get the correct results of attacks detection. While following
the right steps, some domains may try to infer other domains’ privacy for certain purpose. CS
and DS will provide the right calculation service, but may use the intermediate results generated
by intermediate steps in calculation to infer and spy privacy from domains.
We assume that all privacy peers have the potential to be external adversary through eavesdrop-
ping or other methods to illegally obtain input peers’ privacy. In addition to the roles included
in this program, any other external eavesdropper is also the adversary we need to tackle.
C. Security Goal
The purpose of this paper is to obtain accurate cross-domain DDoS attacks detection results
under the premise of privacy protection. Privacy peers may steal privacy as the external adver-
saries or the semi-honest adversaries. Furthermore, privacy peers may collude with each other.
In our solution, we allow one or more domains to collude with each other, with CS, and with
DS. Based on these, we make the following assumptions:
1) Each domain performs function honestly but may have interest in the private information
of other domains.
2) CS or DS performs calculation process correctly but may have interest in obtaining do-
mains’ private information.
3) CS or DS may collude with one or more domains. Semi-honest privacy peers do follow
the protocol but try to infer peers’ privacy as much as possible from the values they learn.
Thus, CS or DS may collude with one or more domains.
4) CS and DS do not collude with each other. In reality, DS and CS can be deployed by
different operators. Operators are likely to have conflict of interests, so it is assumed that
CS does not collude with DS.
Before describing our security goals, we introduce a security definition (i.e., Definition 2), an
adversarial indistinguishability experiment PrivKA·pi (n) as shown in Table III, and a definition
about negligible (i.e., Definition 3) for a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary (A) [42].
Definition 2: (Indistinguishability). A private-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec)
has indistinguishable encryptions under an attack, if for all PPT adversaries A there is a negligible
function ε such that Pr [PrivKA·pi (n) = 1] =
1
2
+ ε(n), where the probability is taken over the
randomness used by A, as well as the randomness used in the experiment.
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TABLE III
INDISTINGUISHABILITY EXPERIMENT PrivKA·pi (n)
The indistinguishability experiment PrivKA·pi (n):
1. A key k is generated by running Gen (1n).
2. The adversary A is given input 1n, and outputs a pair of messages m0, m1 of the same length.
3. A uniform bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen, and then a ciphertext c← Enc (mb) is computed and given to A.
4. A outputs a bit b′.
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise. In the former case, we say
that A succeeds.
Definition 3: (Negligible). A function f from the natural numbers to the nonnegative real
numbers is negligible if for every positive polynomial p there is an N such that for all integers
n > N it holds that f (n) <
1
p (n)
.
We aim at achieving the security objective of keeping privacy of each domain. We specify
our security goals as follows:
1) For CS and DS, input peers privacy is protected.
2) For domains, other input peers’ privacy is protected.
IV. CLASSIFICATION METHOD
To adapt to the proposed privacy protection scheme, we design a classifier by the kNN
algorithm, decoupling it into two steps and embedding the encryption steps into it. In this
section, we will introduce the details of how traffic classification is carried out.
A. Improved kNN as Classifier
In general, kNN is implemented by linear scanning [43]. In linear scanning, we need calculate
every distance between the test data and training data, and than sort and find the nearest k
instances. When the training dataset is very large, the computation will be very time-consuming.
KD-tree is a balanced binary tree that divides the entire attribute space into specific d parts
according to the number of attributes of the dataset, and then carries out relevant query operations
in a specific space. Best Bin First (BBF) is an optimization algorithm for querying on the KD-
tree, the main idea of which is to sort the nodes in the ”querying path”, and the retroactive
checking is always performed from the best-priority tree node. Using KD-Tree to store training
13
Algorithm 1 Improved kNN Algorithm
Input: Training datasets Dt, test instance t, timeout limit L.
Output: Detection result y.
1: Building KD-tree based on the dimensions of training data in CS.
2: calculating the preliminary results from the ordered training data in CS.
3: Removing the perturbation from preliminary results to get the correct distance in DS.
4: t as the root is added into traversal queue.
5: Initializing a queue Qk.
6: while traversal queue is not null and (L! = 0) do
7: node ← traversal queue’ top.
8: Get the distance between node and t distance.
9: if distance < Qk’s top then
10: remove Qk’s top.
11: Insert node to Qk.
12: if node’s n-th dimension’s value 5 t’s n-th dimension’s value then
13: node’s left children enters traversal queue.
14: traverse right subtree.
15: else
16: node’s right children enters traversal queue.
17: traverse left subtree.
18: Getting the detection result y by queue Qk.
19: return y.
dataset and searching with BBF not only don’t need to calculate every distance between test
data and training data, but also improve the efficiency. Readers interested in KD-Tree or BBF
can read literature [44], because these are not the focus of Predis, we don’t detail describe it
here.
In Section III, we have introduced the system model where CS has the training dataset, and
DS provides detection service. So, we decoupled kNN into two steps: In the first step, CS builds
a KD-tree based on the training dataset, and calculates the preliminary results of the distance
between the test data and the ordered training data. The second step, DS gets the preliminary
results and finds the nearest k instances by using BBF. The time complexity of kNN with linear
scan is O (n log k), and with BBF the time complexity is O(n). When the dataset is large, the
time consumption shorten by BBF is very impressive. Main steps are shown in Algorithm 1.
B. Feature Selection
The proposed DDoS attacks detection scheme is based on the flow table obtained from SDNs
controllers. As there are a lot of redundant information inside, which affects not only the detection
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efficiency but also the results, we extract feature information from the flow table. Normal traffic
is generally interactive because the purpose of it is to obtain or provide services, but the number
of ports and source IP addresses will increase significantly when DDoS attacks occur. One of
the other features of a DDoS attacks is source IP spoofing, which usually results in a lot of
traffic with a small number of packets with a small number of bytes. Normal flow usually has
many packets, and the number of flow’s bytes is larger. So we calculate the median of packets
per flow and bytes per flow to reinforce this feature instead of the mean, because the mean is
possible to smooth this feature.
To quantify these characteristics, five parameters are used in the feature selection module,
including MPF, MBF, PCF, GOP and GSI, which are elaborated as follows:
1) Median of Packets per Flow (MPF), which describes the number of packets’ median in
every n flows. We rank the flows X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} in ascending order based on the
number of packets per flow, and then compute the median value according to Formula (1).
M (X) =
X(n+1)/2, n is odd;X(n/2) + X(n/2+1)
2
, otherwise.
(1)
2) Median of Bytes per Flow (MBF), which describes the number of bytes’ median in every
n flows. We rank the flows in ascending order based on the number of bytes per flow, and
then compute the median value.
3) Percentage of Correlative Flow (PCF), which describes the number of flows with interactive
features in every n flows. We define flow X as X = (srcIP = A, dstIP = B) and
flow Y as Y = (srcIP = B, dstIP = A), where X and Y use the same protocol.
PCF = inactN/n, where inactN is the number of X in addition to the number of Y .
4) Growth of Ports (GOP), which describes the growth rate of the number of ports within a
fixed time. GOP = portN/t, where t is the fixed time interval and portN is the number
of port growth.
5) Growth of Source IP Addresses (GSI), which describes the growth rate of the number
of source IP addresses within one fixed time. GSI = srcIPN/t, where srcIPN is the
number of source IP addresses growth.
V. PRIVACY-PRESERVING CROSS-DOMAIN ATTACKS DETECTION SCHEME
In this section, we describe the workflow of Predis and detail the processes of how to
combine privacy protection in DDoS attacks detection.
15
Algorithm 2 Traffic Pretreatment in Each SDNs Domain
Input: Traffic data of flow table.
Output: Ciphertext passed to DS CDS , ciphertext passed to CS CCS .
1: Initialize seven tuple set T by feature selection module’s formula and traffic data of flow table.
2: while 1 do
3: for ∀t ∈ T do
4: for i← 0 < 6 do
5: Random generation disturbance parameter r = {0, 1}231.
6: ∆ti = ti + r.
7: for ∀∆t ∈ ∆T do
8: CCS ← Encskc (∆t).
9: for ∀r∈ R do
10: CDS ← Encskd (r).
11: return CDS to DS.
12: return CCS to CS.
A. Encryption in Data Transmission Process
To avoid traffic data being leaked in transmission process, we leverage the TLS [45].
TLS is a security protocol that provide secure connections between two applications to
communicate across a network to exchange data and is designed to prevent eavesdropping and
tampering. Before the application layer protocol communication, TLS protocol has completed the
encryption algorithm, the communication key agreement and server authentication. Application
layer protocol can be created transparently on the TLS protocol. TLS consists of three basic
steps: The client asks and verifies the public key to the server; Both parties negotiate to generate
session key; Both parties use the session key for encrypted communications. TLS for information
transfer across a network is considered safe and reliable up to now.
B. Traffic Pretreatment in Domains
In traffic pretreatment, domains need collect traffic and abstract each piece of traffic in-
formation as a seven tuple, followed by generating perturbation parameter respectively. The
obtained seven tuple is encrypted by the perturbation parameter. Ultimately, domains transmit
the encrypted seven tuple to CS, the perturbation parameter to DS, as shown in Algorithm 2.
Domains collect and transmit traffic information every 3 seconds, since an overly long interval
would cause the network paralyzed before the attacks are detected, while an overly short one
16
(a) SDNs Flow Table Content (b) Traffic Pretreatment
Fig. 3. The Format of SDNs Flow Table and Traffic Pretreatment.
would make the resource utilization of detection module too high to handle other requests in
the controller, which can cause heavy load on the link between the controller and its switches.
As mentioned in Section IV-B, the information needed in detection are source IP, destination
IP, source port, destination port, flow bytes, and flow packets. Domains go through the process
written in the flow table with the equations described in Section IV-B and calculate the MPF,
MBF, PCF, GOP and GSI. We define a seven tuple as 〈Serial Number, Time, MPF, MBF, PCF,
GOP and GSI 〉. The functions of Serial Number and Time are similar to the primary key
in relational database. It is a label that uniquely identifies this flow table item generated by
domains. In experiments we set the Serial Number as number n for n-th domain participating in
detection, and Time as the timestamp of the flow table item. Each attribute in the seven tuple is
stored as a binary of 33 bits (we add an additional bit as an overflow flag), and the total length
of the seven tuple is 231 bits. Attributes less than 33 bits will be filled with 0 in front.
In each domain, the disturbance parameter is added to the seven tuple. Using the TLS, domains
securely deliver the encrypted seven tuple to CS, and, the disturbance parameter to DS. Flow
table content is shown in Figure 3(a) and the schematic diagram of the traffic pretreatment in
domains is shown in Figure 3(b).
C. Preliminary Calculation in CS
Upon receiving the encrypted seven tuple, CS calculates preliminary seven tuple used for
attacks detection. Then, CS sends the results to DS by using TLS.
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(a) Preliminary Calculation in CS (b) Attacks Detection in DS
Fig. 4. Schematic Diagram of Preliminary Calculation and Attacks Detection.
Algorithm 3 Preliminary Calculation in CS
Input: Training data Dt, set of encrypted seven tuple 4T .
Output: CDS .
1: while 1 do
2: for ∀t ∈ T do
3: for ∀dt ∈ Dt do
4: PreR = Dt − t.
5: for ∀preR ∈ PreR do
6: CDS ← Encskc (preR).
7: return CDS to DS.
The calculation process in CS is exhibited in Algorithm 3. Predis employs the kNN for
attacks detection, computing distance is thus an important step. We calculate the preliminary
results of the distance between the test data and the training data. CS calculates preliminary results
in the received encrypted seven tuple directly and obtains the distance between the disturbance
data and the training data. We leave the work of removal of the perturbation and get the exact
result of distance to DS. The schematic diagram is shown in Figure 4(a).
D. Attacks Detection in DS
The attacks detection process in DS is abstracted in Figure 4(b) and exhibited in Algorithm 4.
Upon receiving domains’ perturbation parameters and CS’s preliminary results of the distance,
DS removes the perturbation from preliminary results to get the correct distance. The improved
kNN uses the correct distance to get correct detection results. Finally, if the classifier finds DDoS
attacks, DS will returns the alarm (Serial Number and Time) to domains. Domains’ operator
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Algorithm 4 Attacks Detection in DS
Input: Seven tuple of preliminary calculation’s result PreR, perturbation parameter R.
Output: Alarm from detection A.
1: while 1 do
2: for ∀preR ∈ PreR do
3: for ∀r ∈ R do
4: fanlR = preR− r.
5: Doing attacks detection by using FanlR.
6: get the detection result A by Algorithm 1.
7: return A to domains.
will respond appropriately after receiving an alarm.
The calculation results of CS are training data Dt minus the perturbed seven tuple ∆T (Dt−
∆T ). Since DS has the perturbation parameters R, it can get the correct distance for attacks
detection by using the perturbation parameters with the calculation results of CS (Dt−∆T −R)
subtracted. Finally, the improved kNN calculates the results of DDoS attacks detection.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As described in Section III-C, our security goal is to protect the privacy of each input peers.
Predis uses TLS to protect privacy in data transmission process. TLS is generally accepted
as secure for data transfer across a network. Besides the correct data receiver, any external
eavesdropper cannot eavesdropping and tampering data. Therefor, we don’t analysis the security
of TLS here.
A scheme is secure if any PPT adversary succeeds in breaking the scheme with at most
negligible probability [42]. In other words, PPT adversary succeeds in the indistinguishable
experiment which is showed in Table III with at most negligible probability, we could say that
the scheme is secure. It is the Asymptotic Approach in model cryptography to prove the security
of a scheme and we use this idea in the following.
In this section, we would use the idea of the Asymptotic Approach and present the proofs
by showing the indistinguishability in the following two situations. That is, for CS and DS,
input peers’ private information is indistinguishable, and for domains, other input peers’ private
information is indistinguishable.
Before formal security analysis, we first set out the meaning of each representation: T is private
information mentioned in Section III-C; 4T is the set of encrypted T ; R is the disturbance
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parameter of each domains; PreR is preliminary calculation’s result output by CS.
As for domains, what the legal data domains have is their own data and detection result. When
they try to gain privacy from others, such as when through means of external eavesdropper,
privacy is indistinguishable.
As for CS, the legal data it has is 4T = T +R. We construct an encryption scheme ΠCS as
shown in Table IV. We give a theorem (Theorem 1) for it and prove it. If CS does not collude
with domains, it is merely a ciphertext-only eavesdropping adversary at this point. If CS colludes
with one or more domains, this attack would be a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) in construction
ΠCS’ s encryption scheme. In a ciphertext-only attack, the only thing the adversary needs to do
is eavesdrop on the public communication channel over which encrypted messages are sent [42].
In the chosen-plaintext attack the adversary is assumed to be able to obtain encryptions and/or
decryptions of plaintexts/ciphertexts of its choice [42]. Chosen-plaintext adversary has more
useful information than the ciphertext-only adversary, and chosen-plaintext adversary is harder
to prevent than the ciphertext-only adversary. When we stopped the chosen-plaintext adversary,
we can stopped the ciphertext-only adversary.
By Proof 1, we demonstrate Construction ΠCS is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme
for messages of length l. Thus, input peers’ private information is indistinguishable for CS.
Theorem 1: If G is a pseudorandom function, then Construction ΠCS is a CPA-secure private-
key encryption scheme for messages of length l.
Proof 1: Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme that is exactly the same as ΠCS ,
except that a truly random function g is used in place of Gk. Fix an arbitrary ppt adversary A,
and let q(n) be an upper bound on the number of queries that A (1n) makes to its encryption
oracle. We show that there is a negligible function ε(n) as follow and prove this by reduction.∣∣∣Pr [PrivKcpaA·ΠCS (n) = 1]− Pr [PrivKcpaA·ΠCS (n) = 1]∣∣∣ = ε(n) (2)
We use A to construct a distinguisher D for the pseudorandom function G. The distinguisher
D is given oracle access to some function O, and its goal is to determine whether this function is
“pseudorandom” (i.e., equal to Gk for uniform k ∈ {0, 1}n or “random”). To do this, D emulates
experiment PrivKcpa for A in the manner described below, and observes whether A succeeds
or not. If A succeeds then D guesses that its oracle must be a pseudorandom function, whereas
if A does not succeed then D guesses that its oracle must be a random function.
D runs in polynomial time since A does. The key points are as follows:
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TABLE IV
CONSTRUCTION OF ΠCS
Let G be a pseudorandom function. Define a private-key encryption scheme for messages of length l.
Gen: on input 1n, choose uniform K ∈ {0, 1}n and output it.
Enc: on input a key K ∈ {0, 1}n and a massage m ∈ {0, 1}l(n), output the ciphertext.
C := 〈r,G(K) + m〉
Dec: on input a key K ∈ {0, 1}n and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}l(n), output the plaintext message.
M := 〈G(K)− s〉
If D’s oracle is a pseudorandom function, then the view of A when running as a subroutine by
D is distributed identically to the view of A in experiment PrivKcpaA·ΠCS (n). This is because, in
this case, a key k is chosen uniformly at random and then every encryption is carried out
by choosing a uniform r, and setting the ciphertext equal to 〈r,G(K) + m〉, exactly as in
Construction ΠCS .
If D’s oracle is a random function, then the view of A when running as a subroutine by D is
distributed identically to the view of A in experiment PrivKcpa
A·ΠCS (n). This can be seen exactly
as above, with the only difference being that a uniform function is used instead of Gk.
Pr [C = c|M = m] = Pr [M + K = c|M = m] = Pr [m + K = c]
= Pr [K = c−m] = 1
2l
(3)
Through Formula (3), we know Pr
[
PrivKcpa
A·ΠCS (n) = 1
]
=
1
2
. Combining the above and the
assumption that G is a pseudorandom function, there exists a negligible function ε(n) for which
Pr
[
PrivKCSA·ΠCS (n) = 1
]
=
1
2
+ε(n). From the Definition 2, we have proved Construction ΠCS
is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme for messages of length l. 
As for DS, the legal data it has is R and PreR. Since PreR = Dt−4T and4T = T+R, DS
has legal data Dt−T . We construct an encryption scheme ΠDS as shown in Table V. If DS does
not collude with one or more domains, it is a ciphertext-only eavesdropping adversary at this
point for encryption scheme ΠDS . If DS colludes with one or more domains: having no other
CS’s private key, they would be unable to get other input peers’ 4T . DS owns perturbation
parameter PreR. Therefore, this situation is CPA-secure in encryption scheme ΠDS , which
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TABLE V
CONSTRUCTION OF ΠDS
Gen: choose K ∈ {0, 1}n and output it.
Enc: on input a key K ∈ {0, 1}n and a massage m ∈ {0, 1}l(n), output the ciphertext.
C := 〈K −m〉
Dec: on input a key K ∈ {0, 1}n and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}l(n), output the plaintext message.
M := 〈K − s〉
is stated in Theorem 2. By Proof 2, we demonstrate that input peers’ private information is
indistinguishable for DS.
Theorem 2: The encryption scheme ΠDS is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme for
messages of length l.
Proof 2: Through Formula (4), we learn that Pr
[
PrivKDSA·ΠDS (n) = 1
]
=
1
2
+ D(K) in
ciphertext-only attack, where D(K) is the probability of guessing training set.
Pr [C = c|M = m] = Pr [K −M = c|M = m] = Pr [K −m = c]
= Pr [K = c + m]
(4)
In general, there are 2500 records in training data set for kNN, each of them being 32*5=160
bits in our scheme. Thus, D (k) =
1
22500×160
. With the idea of asymptotic approach, we consider
D (k) negligible.
In chosen-plaintext attack, Pr
[
PrivKDSA·ΠDS (n) = 1
]
could be equal with
1
2
+
q(n)
22500×160
, where
q(n) is the number of queries to the Oracle.
If Q(n) is a polynomial about n, ε(n)∗Q(n) is still negligible. In encryption scheme ΠDS , q(n)
is a polynomial about the number of collusive domians, so
q(n)
22500×160
is negligible. Encryption
scheme ΠDS has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack. 
VII. EVALUATION
This section evaluates Predis in terms of accuracy, expansibility, time consumption, and
compatibility.
A. Preliminary
Dataset. Since simulating attack scenarios has a major defect in terms of traffic diversity, we
employ five sets of public traffic traces for our experiments, including the CAIDA “DDoS attacks
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TABLE VI
STATISTICS OF DATASET 1
Domains
1999 DARPA LLDOS 1.0 LLDOS 2.0.2
Packets Flows Packets Flows Packets Flows
172.16.112.* 1573963 427056 1237 1104 376 354
172.16.113.* 585996 236122 338 328 255 254
172.16.114.* 835099 311354 344 258 24 16
172.16.115.* 5090 3838 2428 1336 632 611
131.84.1.31(Victim) 35645 17830 108509 107465 2100 2003
202.77.162.213(Attacker) 52606 24498 3722 3174 1724 1634
Domains Merge 2502403 1020698 116578 107667 5111 560
2007” traces [46], the CAIDA Anonymized 2008 Internet traces [47], the 2000 DARPA LLDOS
1.0 and LLDOS 2.0.2 traces [4], the 1999 DARPA traces [4], and the KDD Cup 1999 traces
[48]. Besides, we deployed a DDoS attacks experiment and captured relevant traffic traces for
our experiments. The file format of these datasets is .pcap which pertains every packets’ detail.
We parse these .pcap files by flow statistics to simulate the flow table collected by a controller
in SDNs.
Using the combinations of these traces, we define three datasets for experiments.
Dataset 1. The 1999 DARPA and 2000 LLDOS traces were collected from the same network
topology. Thus, in Dataset 1, we use the 1999 DARPA traces as normal traffic, and use the 2000
LLDOS traces as anomaly traffic. We segment domains by the IP address segment. Victims and
attackers are located in different domains. Statistics of Dataset 1 are shown in Table VI.
Dataset 2. All traffic in the CAIDA were collected from both directions of an OC-192 Internet
backbone link by CAIDA’s equinix-chicago monitor. Thus, in Dataset 2, we use the CAIDA
Anonymized 2008 Internet traces as normal traffic, and use the CAIDA “DDoS attacks 2007”
traces as anomaly traffic.
Dataset 3. We used Python and Scapy4 to achieve the simulation of synchronous (SYN) flood
attack. To simulate DDoS attacks, we used 5 hosts to launch SYN flood attacks against a host,
and then collected 5 minutes of abnormal traffic on this victim host. To obtain the abnormal
traffic as clean as possible, when collecting abnormal traffic, we closed all the applications on
4Scapy is a python library used for interactive packet.
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TABLE VII
STATISTICS OF DATASET 3
Packets Flows
Anomaly traffic 114214 79440
Normal traffic 941904 18582
TABLE VIII
STATISTICS OF CROSS VALIDATION USING DATASET 2
Domains
CAIDA Anonymized 2008 CAIDA DDoS attacks 2007
Packets Flows Packets Flows
Sample 1 1370524 243997 435428 63093
Sample 2 1377329 243724 426769 62574
Sample 3 1286528 237956 445796 63749
Sample 4 1299980 234976 431176 63349
Sample 5 1340870 246775 398453 59467
Sample 6 1338945 243518 413624 61057
the victim host. We collected another 45 minutes normal traffic in this victim host when there
is no attacks. Statistics of Dataset 3 are shown in Table VII.
In addtion, the KDD Cup 1999 traces are used alone to evaluate performance of Predis in
part of compatibility. Statistics of the KDD Cup 1999 traces are shown in Table IX.
Cross-Validation. To evaluate the performance difference between Predis and others, we
employ cross-validation for each dataset.
Dataset 1. To protect traffic characteristics of DDoS attacks of per phase in LLDOS, we do
not partition LLDOS’s data. When LLDOS 1.0 is used as the training dataset, LLDOS 2.0.2
will be used as the test dataset. When LLDOS 2.0.2 is used as the training dataset, LLDOS 1.0
will be used as the test dataset. DARPA1999 traces always act as background traffic, selecting
50% of which to create the training dataset and the remaining 50% for validation.
Dataset 2. As network traffic data is time-dependent, we divide traces on a time basis. When
performing cross validation, we divide both the CAIDA Anonymized 2008 Internet traces and
the CAIDA “DDoS attacks 2007” traces into 6 partitions per 3 seconds. Each time we take one
of them as the test dataset, the remainder as the training dataset. Cross validation statistics of
Dataset 2 are shown in Table VIII.
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TABLE IX
STATISTICS OF KDD CUP 1999 TRACES
Type of Attacks Normal DoS Prob U2R
Number of Connections 972781 391502 4107 218
Methods to Compare. Predis is a privacy-preserving cross-domain detection in SDNs. To
evaluate the performance of Predis in a comprehensive way, we select three methods as the
state-of-the-art for comparison, i.e., SVM, SOM, and PSOM. Kokila et al. [20] leverage SVM to
perform DDoS attacks detection in SDNs whereby high accuracy rate has been achieved. Braga
et al. [30] use SOM to perform DDoS attacks detection in SDNs. PSOM is a cross-domain
DDoS detection scheme using SOM as the classifier and introduces privacy-preserving proposed
by Bian et al. [22]. Besides, liner kNN (kNN) is implemented to clear the improvement towards
kNN in Predis in term of speed. We disable the privacy-preserving function in Predis and
name it as PkNN, and Naive Bayes (NB) is also implemented to have a better view.
Comparison Criteria. The fundamental goal of attacks detection is accuracy (i.e., identi-
fying more anomalies in the ground truth and avoiding false alarms) [49]. We use precision
( #correctly divided into attack flows
#correctly and falsely divided into attack flows
) and recall (#correctly divided into attack flows
#all attack flows
) to measure
the detection accuracy.
B. Evaluation of Classifier Performance
(1) Selection of The Best k Value.
To find the best k value for the improved kNN in Predis, we observe the changes in time
consumption, precision, and recall, when k increases from 5 to 35 gradually, where the privacy-
preserving component in Predis is temporarily disabled. Subsequently, we determine and select
the best k value for our scheme. The experimental data for evaluation is the Sample 1 in Dataset
2. The training dataset size is 2400, including 1200 normal traffic instances and 1200 abnormal
traffic instances, whose scale remains unchanged in the following experiments.
Experimental results are depicted in Figure 5, where the vertical coordinates are changes
in the k value. Figure 5(a) and (b) exhibit the evaluation results of precision (recall) and time
consumption, respectively. We can find that an appropriate k value lies between 20 and 25, where
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(a) Precision (b) Time Consumption
Fig. 5. Precision and Time Consumption by Varying k.
Predis achieves relatively high accuracy without introducing heavy time overhead. Thus, we
choose the k value as 23 in the following experiments.
(2) Classifier Performance.
To better comprehend the performance of the classifier in Predis in speed and accuracy, we
conduct a comparison between Predis, PkNN, kNN, PSOM, SOM, SVM and NB by using
Dataset 3, which results is depicted in Figure 6. It can be seen from the Figure 6(a), compared
to other algorithms, kNN has a higher accuracy, but its speed has no advantage.
Although we use some algorithms (KD-tree and BBF) to improve its speed, it is still not the
least time consumption algorithm as shown in the Figure 6(b) by the PkNN speed. An important
reason for choosing kNN as the classifier in Predis is that kNN is easy to calculate (cf.,
Section IV-A) which facilitates embedding the encryption steps into it, and another reason is
that kNN has relatively higher accuracy which have been confirmed in this experiment. Besides,
Predis and PSOM have relatively high time consumption because of the privacy protection
process.
C. Evaluation of Accuracy
(1) Accuracy evaluation between single-domain and cross-domain scenarios.
Cross-validation is conducted using Dataset 1. From the results in Table X, we can see that
the precision and recall of the single-domain detection is lower than those of the cross-domain
detection, which undoubtedly proves our stance that DDoS attacks detection in cross-domain is
truly necessary. We also observe that Predis is superior to PSOM in terms of presicion and
recall. In domain 172.16.115.*, Predis and PSOM both have low precision and recall. The
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(a) Evaluation of Accuracy (b) Evaluation of Time Consumption
Fig. 6. Comprehensive Evaluation of the Classifier in Predis.
TABLE X
ACCURACY COMPARISON BETWEEN SINGLE-DOMAIN AND CROSS- DOMAIN APPROACHES
LLDOS 1.0 as Training Dataset LLDOS 2.0.2 as Training Dataset
Precision Recall Precision Recall
Domains Predis PSOM Predis PSOM Predis PSOM Predis PSOM
172.16.112.* 0.9720 0.9713 0.9010 0.5558 0.9730 0.9700 0.9000 0.6734
172.16.113.* 0.9973 0.9600 0.9930 0.6700 0.9914 0.9651 0.9916 0.8100
172.16.114.* 0.9900 0.9843 0.9874 0.7800 0.9255 0.7630 0.8500 0.7180
172.16.115.* 0.8980 0.8741 0.8865 0.8700 0.8690 0.8053 0.8500 0.8156
Victim 0.9710 0.8160 0.9750 0.7071 0.8320 0.8086 0.7020 0.6700
Attacker 0.9200 0.7753 0.9200 0.7200 0.9052 0.4133 0.8700 0.6400
Domains Merge 0.9985 0.9780 0.9923 0.9653 0.9920 0.8986 0.9812 0.8200
reason lies in that fewer hosts are invaded by attackers in domain 172.16.115.*, and invaded
hosts have not generated many abnormal traffic. The lack of training dataset results in not so
outstanding detection results. But Predis’s precision and recall is still above 0.88.
(2) Accuracy evaluation of detecting DDoS attacks at early stages.
It is desirable to detect DDoS attacks at the first and second stages. We conduct cross-validation
in Dataset 1 and divided Dataset 1’s traces into three stages (scanning, intrusion, and attacking).
At both the attack scanning and intrusion stages, Predis delivers excellent detection results as
shown in Table XI, which means that Predis can identify attacks at early stages. In contrast
to PSOM, Predis achieves better detection results at any stage of the attack, and its detection
result at stages of scanning and intrusion is suboptimal. Moreover, the precision of Predis is
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TABLE XI
DDOS ATTACKS DETECTION ACCURACY AT EACH STAGE
LLDOS 1.0 as Training Dataset LLDOS 2.0.2 as Training Dataset
Precision Recall Precision Recall
Domains Predis PSOM Predis PSOM Predis PSOM Predis PSOM
Scanning 0.9734 0.8730 0.8645 0.7630 0.8612 0.8053 0.9251 0.8945
Intrusion 0.9920 0.8740 0.9900 0.8821 0.9400 0.8392 0.8830 0.8755
Attacking 0.9919 0.9733 0.9614 0.9200 0.9808 0.9472 0.8792 0.8740
(a) Precision (b) Recall
Fig. 7. The Results of Precision and Recall of n-th Cross-Validation Using Dataset 2.
0.9919 when LLDOS 1.0 as the training dataset at the attacking stage.
(3) Accuracy evaluation with privacy-preserving or without.
Using Dataset 2 for cross-validation, we make a comparison between Predis, the SVM and
SOM methods. To evaluate the impact of privacy-preserving in Predis on detection accuracy,
we also disable the privacy-preserving function in Predis and refer to this variation as CAD
in comparison.
Experimental results are plotted in Figure 7, where the precision and recall are exhibited in
two subfigures, respectively. The x-axis indicates the serial number in cross-validation.
When we detail Predis in Section V-D, we have proved through theoretical analysis that the
detection result of introducing privacy protection will not have any impact on detection accuracy.
This conclusion is validated in Figure 7, where Predis and CAD obtain the same detection
accuracy. In addition, we can find that Predis outperforms the other two methods in terms of
both precision and recall.
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TABLE XII
EVALUATION OF DETECTION ACCURACY WITH VARIED NUMBERS OF DOMAINS USING DATASET 1
LLDOS 1.0 as Training Dataset LLDOS 2.0.2 as Training Dataset
Precision Recall Precision Recall
Number of domains Predis PSOM Predis PSOM Predis PSOM Predis PSOM
1 0.9720 0.9713 0.9010 0.5558 0.9730 0.9700 0.9000 0.6734
2 0.9840 0.9672 0.9769 0.6530 0.9207 0.9270 0.9501 0.9468
3 0.9912 0.9760 0.9800 0.6734 0.9232 0.9105 0.9543 0.9208
4 0.9914 0.9613 0.9900 0.7133 0.9308 0.9256 0.9683 0.9660
5 0.9920 0.9514 0.9913 0.8320 0.9591 0.8512 0.9537 0.9201
6 0.9880 0.9438 0.9864 0.7689 0.9508 0.8380 0.9517 0.9106
Average 0.9864 0.9618 0.9709 0.6994 0.9424 0.9037 0.9463 0.8896
(a) LLDOS 1.0 as Training Dataset (b) LLDOS 2.0.2 as Training Dataset
Fig. 8. Evaluation of Time Consumption with Varied Numbers of Domains Using Dataset 1.
D. Evaluation of Scalability
Using Dataset 1, we record the changes of time consumption and accuracy when the number
of domains goes up from one to six, as shown in Table XII and Figure 8.
When the number of domains increases, time consumption is only determined by the amount
of traffic instances and, the detection effect remains almost unchanged. The time complexity of
the improved kNN is O(n), where n is the number of traning instances. As can be seen from
the experimental results, the time consumption of Predis does not surge and meets linear
variations as the number of domains increases.
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(a) Time Consumption with Varied Numbers of Flows (b) Evaluation of Time Consumption Using Dataset 2
Fig. 9. Evaluation of Time Consumption.
E. Evaluation of Time Consumption
First, from Figure 8, we can see that with the increasing number of domains, Predis has
obvious advantages in terms of time-consumption compared to PSOM.
We analyze the MAWI dataset [50] which are based on the collected network traffic during
7 years of a specific link between Japan and the USA. The backbone generates about 6,000
KB (130,000 flows) traffic per second. If we can process 13,000 flows per second (1/10 of the
traffic generated by this backbone line), it shows that Predis can meet the time-consuming
requirement. The time spent is the sum of the time spent between CS and DS. We record the
time spent on two server when the amount of test instances increase from 1,000 to 10,000, where
Dataset 2 is used. From Figure 9(a) we can see that when 10,000 flows for testing, the total
time does not exceed 1 second. With privacy-preserving, the time consumption of Predis is
also acceptable.
In addition, using Dataset 2, we record the time spent in 6 cross-validation experiments, where
PSOM is the control group and the results are shown in Figure 9(b). We can see in Figure 9(b),
compared to a similar scheme PSOM, Predis has a lower time consumption.
F. Evaluation of Detecting Other Attacks
We hope that the attacks detection scheme will detect not only DDOS attacks but also other
attacks. We testify through evaluation that Predis is not only suitable for detecting DDOS
attacks, but also capable to detect a variety of attacks and retains an excellent accuracy after
changing the feature selection model properly. We conduct experiments using the KDD Cup 1999
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TABLE XIII
TIME CONSUMPTION ON DETECTING OTHER ATTACKS
DOS Prob U2R
Criterion Predis PSOM Predis PSOM Predis PSOM
Precision 0.9161 0.8872 0.9901 0.8753 0.8834 0.8810
Recall 0.9003 0.8706 0.9874 0.9644 0.7900 0.7650
Total Time 616ms 707ms 785ms 833ms 569ms 640ms
TABLE XIV
EVALUATION OF ACCURACY IN DETECTING OTHER ATTACKS
DOS Prob U2R
Criterion Predis SOM SVM Predis SOM SVM Predis SOM SVM
Precision 0.9161 0.8872 0.9024 0.9901 0.8753 0.9732 0.8834 0.8310 0.8604
Recall 0.9103 0.8706 0.9041 0.9874 0.9644 0.9566 0.7900 0.7650 0.7622
traces, which have several other types of attacks besides DDoS attacks. The feature selection
model here is a four-tuple (Count, Src bytes, Dst bytes, Logged in).
(1) Time consumption evaluation when detecting other attacks.
We detect three types of attacks in the KDD Cup 1999 traces, such as DOS, Prob, and U2R,
and record the time it takes as well as accuracy. Results are depicted in Table XIII.
(2) Accuracy evaluation when detecting other attacks.
We detect three types of attacks in the KDD Cup 1999 traces, such as DOS, Prob, and U2R,
and record the accuracy in Table XIV, where SOM and SVM are compared.
When detecting attacks of DoS, Prob, and U2R, the precision of Predis is no less than 90%.
Compared to the same privacy-preserving scheme PSOM, Predis is better in terms of time
consumption (as shown in Table XIII). Because in the KDD Cup 1999 traces, U2R attacks have
very few abnormal traffic instances, therefore recall is relative low when testing U2R attacks.
Compared with SVM and SOM, Predis wins out as far as precision and recall are concerned
(as shown in Table reftable:Time-Accuracy evaluation when detect other attack). Through these
two experiments, it has been proven that Predis not only can detect DDoS attacks excellently,
but also can detect other attacks very well when appropriately selected features are incorporated.
31
VIII. DISCUSSION
If SDNs controllers can know the DDoS attacks in it early stages in time and make corre-
sponding measures (e.g., limiting the SYN / ICMP traffic, filtering specific IP addresses, traffic
cleaning, etc.), SDNs controllers can prevent the DDoS attacks before it causes damage. SDNs
uses centralized control for traffic forwarding mechanism that makes it easier to stop DDoS
attacks. Predis has been demonstrated that it can detect DDoS attacks in the early stages of
an attack (as show in Table XI). Once the server detects a DDoS attacks, it alerts the controller
in time. The controller immediately responds to the alert, and prevents any further damage from
the attack.
The roles in Predis include two servers and SDNs controllers. Predis can prevent the
collusion between one or more domains with one server, so the two servers can be respectively
deployed in any one of the participating domains, or wherever providing secure communications
with the domains over the TLS protocol. The data plane and the control plane of the SDNs
communicate by using a control-data-plane interface (CDPI). The main use of the uniform
communication standard is OpenFlow protocol. Flow table operations that include flow table
pretreatment, communicate with the server, proper handling for DDoS alerts or other operation
can be deployed and implemented through the use of the southbound interfaces (i.e., COPI).
Due to the development of different network access technologies and different communication
systems, resource scheduling and fusion in heterogeneous networks have become hot topics.
SDNs can achieve unified management in configuration heterogeneous network equipment and
it open a variety of interfaces. But these interfaces perhaps is exploited by attackers, such as
tapping, interception and DDoS attacks. We can regard the heterogeneous networks as a domain
under the unified management of a SDNs. Using Predis, Users can achieve secure cross-
domain DDoS attacks detection and resist the threats from DDoS attacks in heterogeneous
networks. In addition, Predis’s idea of combining data perturbation with data encryption to
provide cross-domain privacy protection may also be transplanted to other application scenarios
in the future to achieve other secure multi-party computing. Overlay networks such as P2P (Peer-
to-Peer) add virtual channels to physical networks to enhance network flexibility. Each node in
P2P networks may be the data provider. When considering monitoring the traffic of multiple
nodes without compromising the privacy, each node in the P2P can be considered as a domain,
and the idea of Predis in cross-domain detection can be used to provide security monitoring
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service.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a SDN-based cross-domain attacks detection scheme with privacy
protection. We studied cross-domain privacy protection problems and DDoS attacks detection
based on SDNs. We combined geometric transformation and data encryption method with the
view to protect privacies. We broke down the detection process into two steps, disturbance and
detection, and introduced two servers that work together to complete the detection process. We
optimized the kNN for low time consumption and high accuracy. Extensively experiment results
showed that Predis is capable to detect cross-domain anomalies while preserving the privacy
with low time consumption and high accuracy. We plan to further reduce the time consumption
of Predis in attacks detection in the future work.
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